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The purpose of this project is to study the benefits that the Multiple Independent 
Levels of Security (MILS) approach can provide to Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) remote terminal units.  This is accomplished through a heavy 
focus on MILS concepts such as resource separation, verification, and kernel 
minimization and reduction.  Two architectures are leveraged to study the application of 
reduced kernel concepts for a remote terminal unit (RTU).  The first is the LynxOS 
embedded operating system, which is used to create a bootable image of a working RTU.  
The second is the Pistachio microkernel, the features and development environment of 
which are analyzed and catalogued to provide the basis for a future RTU. 
A survey of recent literature is included that focuses on the state of SCADA 
security, the MILS standard, and microkernel research.  The design methodology for a 
MILS compliant RTU is outlined, including a benefit analysis of applying MILS in an 
industrial network setting.  Also included are analyses of the concepts of MILS which are 
relevant to the design and how LynxOS and Pistachio can be used to study some of these 
concepts.  A section detailing the prototyping of RTUs on LynxOS and Pistachio is also 
included, followed by an initial security and performance analysis for both systems. 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background Information 
 
 This project falls under the umbrella of a larger SCADA research project at the 
University of Louisville.  The focus of that project is to mitigate the effects of threats 
caused by electronic attacks on SCADA systems and has risen from ongoing research at 
the University of Louisville that has centered around both SCADA security and 
improving the monitoring process for chemical process control systems.  The project is in 
collaboration with industrial groups such as Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Eon-US Energy 
Corp., and the Louisville Water Company.  It is funded as part of the Kentucky Critical 
Infrastructure Project. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 This project aims to produce a framework for a more secure SCADA RTU 
(remote telemetry unit or remote terminal unit).  At the outset of the project, the focus 
was on applying the Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) standard to these 
RTUs.  However, those plans fell by the wayside as it became apparent that obtaining an 
acceptable MILS specific operation system or kernel would not be possible within this 
project’s time frame.  As full MILS compliance is not currently available, this project 
will instead focus on analyzing the security benefits that MILS could provide RTUs and 
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provide an implementation of a hardened RTU which will exhibit some of these security 
related features. 
 One such attempt was made by creating a minimal kernel using features provided 
by LynxOS, a real time embedded operating system.  This operating system provides the 
means to modify the kernel and custom build bootable images to suit the users needs.  
This allowed the creation of a minimal bootable system, providing only the functionality 
needed for the RTU and nothing extraneous. 
 The second attempt utilized the concept of a predefined microkernel to run the 
RTU software.  This project uses the Pistachio microkernel created by the L4Ka group at 
the University of Karlsruhe, and is based on the L4 microkernel specification.  The 
reasons each of these alternate approaches was pursued will be explained in detail in later 




SCADA systems are used in critical infrastructure.  Increasingly, communication 
between the central SCADA master system and the RTUs is occurring over the Internet 
or other network connections.  The exposure of these RTUs to the network opens them up 
to the problems all other networked computers face: attacks from malicious or malignant 
entities that desire and attempt to harm the system.  Network based attacks such as 
intrusion, denial of service, and worms are all serious risks that must be considered when 
connecting critical infrastructure equipment to the Internet. 
SCADA systems use the DNP-3 protocol for communication between the master 
unit and the RTUs.  DNP-3 provides data fragmentation, error checking, and other 
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features and operates between the physical layer and the networking layer of the network.  
Higher level networking functions are increasingly transmitted using TCP/IP, tying in to 
SCADA’s increasing reliance on the Internet.  There has been research that falls under 
the same umbrella as the parent project of this MILS project, namely the overlying 
SCADA research at the University of Louisville, which has focused on enhancing the 
DNP-3 protocols [36].  However, even if these protocols are perfect and perfectly secure, 
as long as communication occurs over the Internet between the RTU and master unit, 
there will be a risk of attacks such as denial of service (DOS) that can bypass DNP-3. 
Since it is inevitable that many SCADA systems will utilize the Internet for its 
familiarity, ease of use, and wealth of available tools and documentation, a researcher 
into security for SCADA systems must focus on ways to make the entire communication 
process more secure.  The tasks that arise from this need can range from basic networking 
security principles such as setting up routers and disabling remote logon, all the way up 
to the overall security of the underlying operating system.  The latter is the focus of this 
project, which began as a way to research the benefits that the MILS standard would 
supply to the operating system of the RTU. 
The MILS standard provides a verifiably secure kernel, as well as many other 
features which, upon inspection, provide security synergy with the functional aspects of 
SCADA RTUs.  The most important feature to provide this type of synergy is 
partitioning.  MILS defines a method of brick-wall partitioning of memory, kernel access, 
and other system resources.  “Brick-wall” means the operations of one partition cannot 
affect another partition, meaning any errors occurring in, for example, a dedicated 
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networking partition could not cascade and affect monitoring applications in another 
partition. 
A verifiably secure kernel can also provide a huge enhancement to the confidence 
in security of the overall system.  Mathematical verification of most kernels is 
impossible, given the size of the code base of many kernels can approach millions of 
lines of code.  The MILS kernel should provide all base functionality needed for system 
operations, but will be small enough for mathematical verification.  This principle 
removes all extraneous functionality from the kernel, removing with it the problems of 
complexity, bloat, and potential security flaws in extraneous methods or code.   
These two elements of the MILS standard, namely resource partitioning and a 
minimal, verifiable kernel, are what lead to this project’s focus on applying the standard 
to SCADA RTUs.  If any benefits can be gleaned from such a pairing, infrastructure 





Chapter Two focuses on the literature available covering SCADA security, the 
MILS architecture, and microkernel design and security.  Chapter Three outlines the 
concepts of designing a hardened RTU, explain why the MILS standard is appropriate for 
such devices, and detail the ideas which produced the two related, but ultimately non-
MILS prototypes created during this project.  Chapter Four discusses the details and 
implementation of these prototype RTUs, one created using the LynxOS kernel image 
creation tools and the basis of another utilizing the L4 Pistachio microkernel.  Chapter 
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Five provides analysis and applies metric measurements and performance evaluation on 
each of the two base systems, addressing security and performance related questions.  
Chapter Six discusses any conclusions determined through the course of this project, as 
well as future directions for hardened RTU research, including a fully MILS compliant 
RTU and what further benefits that might bring. 
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CHAPTER II: Literature Review 
 




 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have been used for 
years by industry and infrastructure providers such as power and water plants as a means 
of controlling distributed systems from a master location [1].  The typical SCADA 
system consists of a centralized master control unit (sometimes called an MTU, or master 
terminal unit) and distributed Remote Terminal (or Telemetry) Units (RTUs) that control 
and monitor physical equipment and machines such as pumps, latches, and other control 
machines.  SCADA master units typically run on licensed operating systems such as Unix 
and variants, with Microsoft Windows also becoming more widely used.  These operating 
systems provide the human users with an interface to the SCADA system in order to 
monitor and control the overall distributed system from the master unit. 
 
2.1.2 SCADA RTUs 
 
The RTUs provide the distributed backbone of a SCADA system.  RTUs are often 
hardened computers with some type of connection back to the master via either a serial 
port, on board modem [2], or, increasingly, via the Internet or a Local Area Network 
(LAN).  The functions of the RTU include acting as an arbiter for control functions at a 
location remote to the master unit, and monitoring and collecting data from the local site. 
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There are two types of RTUs: ‘single board’ and ‘modular’.  A single board RTU 
contains all chips and circuitry necessary for I/O and processing on a single board while a 
modular RTU has separate modules for CPU, memory, I/O, and other functions [2].  This 
project will focus on using a hardened PC to act as an RTU, implying that a modular 
RTU approach will be required. 
RTUs collect data called points to be sent back to the master unit for storage 
inside a database.  Each point represents a monitored input or output controlled by the 
overall SCADA system.  A so-called “hard point” is data that is directly input or output 
by the system, while a “soft point” is data derived from mathematical operations, usually 
carried out at the RTU. [1]  Complex SCADA systems can have as many as 30,000 to 
50,000 points at once, indicating the necessity of computers for monitoring and control 
purposes.  Graphs of the status of certain points are often created to improve 
understanding of system states by human administrators and users. [3]  The volume of 
data also suggests the need for high bandwidth communication from the distributed RTUs 
back to the master control unit. 
 
2.1.3 Recent SCADA Security Breaches 
 
 SCADA security is currently a hot-button issue, and many organizations both 
industrial and governmental have studied methods for improvement.  First of all, a 
number of articles have been published in relation to security breaches in plants 
providing power and other infrastructure needs.  Brown’s article “SCADA vs. the 
hackers” [4] provides insight into a number of attacks that would be possible, including 
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wireless leaks and overall OS security breaches.  However, there are more concrete 
examples of breaches in SCADA security. 
 In 2003, the Slammer worm impacted the network of the Davis-Besse Nuclear 
Power Plant in Ohio.  The worm infected the internal network of the plant via an 
unpatched vulnerability in MS-SQL and caused slowdown of the plant network, 
ultimately leading to the shutdown of the plants safety monitoring system. [16]  In a 
separate incident in 2001, hackers attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to breach the network 
of CAL-ISO, the company overseeing much of California’s power grid [17].  These 
incidents paint a disturbing picture of the need for a security focus for SCADA systems. 
 
2.1.4 Current SCADA Security Research 
 
 Many groups have conducted research and published findings on SCADA 
security in recent years.  For example, a paper presented to the 2005 IEEE Systems, Man 
and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop outlines best practices for next 
generation SCADA security systems.  Topics include the use of demilitarized zones 
(DMZ) between the SCADA system and the Internet, as well as combating denial of 
service (DoS) attacks by using a modified TCP protocol for transport level 
communication. [18]  
 One article that underlines the emerging trend to integrate SCADA systems with 
the Internet is [19], which outlines the design of a web-based SCADA system using Java 
and XML.  This article does not focus on security, which brings forth the need for a 
security paradigm to possibly be separate from the implementation of the SCADA 
system, such as within the underlying OS and kernel.   
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Other works covering similar themes as these two articles include [20], [21] and 
[22], all articles from the past two years dealing with security, both long- and short-term, 
for SCADA systems.  There are many other such articles in, for example, the IEEE 
Xplore article database, indicating the need and desire from the research community to 
find better solutions to SCADA security quandaries. 
 
 




The Internet has become a crucial component of most SCADA systems today.  In 
fact, it has been stated that, “…it is almost impossible today to buy remote terminal units 
or control systems that are not Web- or network-enabled.” [4]  The benefits that the 
Internet provides to SCADA systems are obvious.  First of all, the protocols used in 
Internet communication are commonly known, as well as easy to implement and use.  
This allows operators setting up SCADA distributed networks to focus on the functions 
of the separate components and not how they communicate.  It also provided the means 





However, placing SCADA communication over the public Internet has opened up 
the potential for many security risks.  The possibility of intruders into a SCADA system 
cannot be ignored.  Indeed, one security survey of a nuclear power plant which used 
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modems for dial-in access revealed several unregistered modems had accessed the 
network [4].  Intercepted messages can also be used to gain information about system 
operation, and masquerade attacks can be used to plant false commands into an unsecured 
communication channel [4].  Basically, any security problem that afflicts the Internet can 
be applied to SCADA networks using this resource.  RTUs can be taken over, data can be 
intercepted, intruders can determine network topography and weak points, and so on. 
The use of public standards such as Ethernet and TCP/IP in SCADA systems has 
made the possibility of attack more likely. Studies have found that more than one third of 
external security incidents use the Internet as the remote point of entry [30].  The same 
study found a dramatic increase in the number of security incidents starting in 2001, with 
an ever increasing percentage of such incidents being external in nature [30].  The 
authors attribute this increase in external incidents to three factors.  The first is the rise, 
beginning with Code Red in 2001, of the automated worm attack.  Such attacks likely 
don’t target SCADA systems specifically, but are still a major risk to system stability if 
infection were to occur.  Second, the use of operating systems and software designed for 
business requirements within the network of critical systems, exposing these systems to 
common IT attacks such as viruses and backdoor exploits.  Third is the increasing 
interconnection of SCADA systems, creating interdependencies that can, without proper 
study and design, open up new avenues for attack. [30]   
Intent by hackers to break into critical infrastructure systems has also been 
recently expressed.  Such individuals often produce tools to aid in the breach of security 
procedures, enabling those who do not have the skills to directly make an attack to do so 
with the help of this software.  Such tools, combined with an increasingly computer 
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literate world population and the opening of SCADA systems to public standards, make 
the difficult task of hacking into a SCADA system slightly easier and will no doubt 
increase the frequency of attempts at such attacks. [31] 
 
 




The acronym MILS stand for Multiple Independent Levels (or Layers) of 
Security.  MILS is a standard that has been designed to allow mathematical verification 
of the security of core systems software by separating security functionality into four 
security policies: Information Flow, Data Isolation, Periods Processing, and Damage 
Limitation [5].  These functionalities are controlled by a partitioning kernel that oversees 
resource and security management for the system.  The concept of a separation kernel 
used to divide memory into separate partitions for application use was first outlined in [6] 
and [7] by John Rushby in the early 1980’s.   The four security policies are described 
below (paraphrased from [5] and [8]): 
 Information Flow control ensures that the flow of data between partitions is 
authenticated end-to-end between sender and receiver.  Information must arrive 
only where intended by the sender. 
 Data Isolation ensures that each partition’s data is accessible only by that 
partition, and that private data cannot be publicly accessed. 
 Periods Processing ensures that exploits using the processor and networking 
hardware cannot give an intruder access to the system. 
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 Damage Limitation (or Fault Isolation) ensures that a failure in one partition will 
not affect the performance or security of another partition.  All failures must be 
detected, contained, and recovered from locally. 
 
By ensuring that a kernel is built from the ground up with these principles in mind, the 
amount of security critical code can be drastically reduced.  This in turn provides the 
ability to apply rigorous mathematical tests and inspections to the kernel [8], something 
that is not possible with current operating systems whose critical features may contain 
millions of lines of code [9].   
 
2.3.2 Evaluation of the MILS Kernel 
 
One of the main objectives of MILS is for the separation kernel to be evaluated at 
EAL 7 [9].  The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) are defined by the Common 
Criteria, a set of internationally defined and recognized standards for evaluation of secure 
software [10].  EAL 7 is the highest possible level of assurance, and states that software 
must be formally (mathematically) verified, designed, and tested to attain an EAL 7 
rating.  By using small code for the separation kernel and security functions, as well as 
enforcing NEATness (see following section), components used in MILS implementations 
can be evaluated at EAL 6+ [8].   
Evaluation consists of the process of verifying and testing, either formally or 
informally, a given piece of software to ensure its compliance with the internationally 
defined EALs.  The following table outlines each EAL from 1 to 7 and provides a brief 
description of each.  Each EAL builds on the previous, so any tests performed at a lower 
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level of assurance will be included in higher level assurance tests.  These criteria are 
formally defined and outlined in [10]. 
Table 2.1 Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL) 
EAL Requirements for Verification 
1 Functionally tested. Analyzes behavior and system documentation. 
2 Structurally tested.  Analyzes more detailed high-level design specifications.  
3 Methodically tested and checked.  More complete testing process. 
4 Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed. Analyzes more detailed design 
specifications and an implementation subset. 
5 Semi-formally designed and tested.  More structured architecture and semi-
formal design description required. 
6 Semi-formally verified, designed, and tested.  Requires improved analysis of 
architecture and improved design description over EAL 5. 
7 Formally verified, designed, and tested.  More comprehensive testing required.  
Formal (mathematical) proof of design and formal representations must be used 
to assure security. 
 
 The formal verification required to meet EAL 7 is not currently possible with 
today’s monolithic kernels, which can contain millions of lines of source code.  The 
MILS kernel seeks to alleviate this quandary using two methods.  The first is to reduce 
the amount of code in the kernel by removing functionality that can be obtained by higher 
level applications while still enforcing the principle of NEATness.  The second is to 
provide brick wall partitioning, allowing for different levels of assurance for applications 
running in separate partitions. [9]  These concepts will be discussed in more detail later in 
this document. 
 
2.3.3 Properties of NEATness 
 
NEATness is essential for an operating system to ensure security.  NEAT is an 
acronym for Non-Bypassable, Evaluatable, Always Invoked, and Tamperproof [8].  
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These properties allow a high assurance level for overall systems security.  These 
attributes of secure operating systems are explained below (adapted from [5] and [8]): 
 Non-Bypassable means security functions cannot be avoided. 
 Evaluatable means that security functions can be formally verified and tested. 
 Always Invoked means security functions are invoked each time they are needed. 
 Tamperproof means poorly written or subversive code cannot modify security 
functions and security related data. 
 
MILS is the first publicly available approach to operating system design that allows for 
NEATness in Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) software and operating systems [8]. 
 
2.3.4 Partitioning Communication Systems 
 
A Partitioning Communication System (PCS) is a middleware component of a 
MILS OS which has authority over all communication between MILS partitions.  While 
those familiar with SCADA systems may recognize the acronym “PCS” to stand for 
process control systems, this PCS is a MILS specific concept and the two shouldn’t be 
confused.  The four main policies that MILS is based on (Information Flow, Data 
Isolation, Periods Processing, and Damage Limitation) are extended to cover end-to-end 
communication between MILS partitions [5].  The MILS PCS uses the separation 
kernel’s control over these four policies and applies them to communication between 
partitions, and also communicates with network protocols and drivers to ensure the 
policies are applied to incoming and outgoing network data [8].  This PCS, combined 
with isolation of network components in a single partition, allows a high-assurance 
backbone for distributed systems by ensuring tight application of security policies on 
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transmitted data.  The following diagram illustrates the function of PCS middleware in a 
MILS RTU. 
 
FIGURE 2.1: A PCS for a MILS RTU 
  
2.3.5 Vendors Offering MILS or MILS-Like Products 
 
A number of companies offer operating systems which implement, or will 
implement, the MILS separation kernel.  Green Hills software offers the INTEGRITY 
line of operating systems utilizing MILS [11].  Wind River has been working on its own 
real time operating system using the MILS architecture.  This implementation uses a 
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Memory Management Unit (MMU) to protect the kernel from applications and to 
partition system memory with their VxWorks OS [12]. 
LynxOS-178 from LynuxWorks is a popular embedded real-time Linux variant 
which implements MILS partitioning [13].  Via correspondence with the company, it has 
been learned that they plan on releasing an OS next year called either LynxSecure which 
will add networking functionality out-of-the-box to their MILS compatible Linux variant 
operating systems.  It is worth noting that none of the above MILS implementations have 
yet been verified at an EAL 6 or above, so they are not considered fully MILS compliant.  
However, LynuxWorks is expecting an EAL 7 assurance level for their upcoming 
product LynxSecure [14], which should allow for full MILS compliance of that operating 
system.  
Objective Interface Systems provides MILS based middleware components.  
PCSexpress, their PCS implementation [15], is their major current contribution to MILS 
middleware and could be combined with an aforementioned MILS OS to enable secure 
networking capabilities on a PC. 
 
2.3.6 Current MILS Research 
  
 To date, much of the work done on the MILS standard has been research and 
theory oriented.  There are a number of papers and articles outlining the design of a 
MILS system and explaining the benefits such a system should provide for security.  The 
article by Van Fleet et al [8] is the quintessential example of such an article.  This article 
is the basis for much of the general knowledge about MILS’ applications and benefits.  
The authors mention the current trend of combining MILS with other security 
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applications such as the aviation standard DO-178B and ARINC-653, the Avionics 
Application Software Standard Interface.  MILS is often combined with other standards 
to create a synergy of operation and enhance security.  One example of such a 
combination is the LynxOS-178 real time operating system (RTOS), which combines a 
partitioning kernel with DO-178B certification and uses ARINC-653 style resource 
partitioning [23]. 
 The University of Idaho’s Center for Secure and Dependable Systems (CSDS) is 
working on MILS partnered with such groups as the NSA, Lockheed-Martin, and the 
aforementioned Objective Interface Systems.  The objectives of the CSDS are to provide 
mathematical foundations for concepts for MILS, as well as providing architectural 
design guidance [24].  While most of the articles published on the CSDS website are 
from 2002 and 2003, some of the Center’s members are still active in the MILS research 
community. 
 
2.3.7 Current Research on Applying MILS to SCADA 
 
 Little has been published in the way of applying MILS to SCADA systems, so 
this project would seem to be leading the way in that regard.  However, there has some 
cross-pollination of interest in the two areas.  Jim Alves-Foss, a prominent member of the 
aforementioned CSDS, has also co-authored articles such as [25], which looks at 
applications of security to real-time control and SCADA systems.  This shows that other 
researchers at least have some cross interest in the study of MILS and SCADA systems, 
though they still have not yet combined the two.   
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 One of the few mentions of the combination of MILS and SCADA comes in the 
form of a newsletter from the Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF), a 
group which focuses on applications of security for SCADA systems and is supported by 
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST).  The newsletter in question 
announces a conference in April of 2006 presenting a demonstration of the MILS 
architecture.  The newsletter notes that the security potential of MILS could be directly 
transferable to critical systems such as SCADA networks, as well as financial, medical, 
and consumer electronic areas. [26]  This again shows that others are thinking along the 
same lines as this project, though they also have still not attempted any implementation 





2.4.1 General Microkernel Principles 
 
 Microkernels have been around for years in many forms.  The idea behind such 
constructs is to minimize the complexity of the kernel, providing greater security and 
performance than more traditional kernels.  This is accomplished by removing all 
functionality that can be implemented at a higher level from the kernel code, leaving only 
essential components inside the kernel. Higher level functionality is controlled by 
programs known as servers which run on top of the kernel to provide services that do not 
require direct access to the underlying hardware. The server approach provides greater 
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flexibility to microkernel based systems, as any additional functionality can be added by 
the creation of a new server for the task, so no modification to the kernel is required. [27] 
 
 
2.4.2 The L4 Microkernel 
 
 The L4 microkernel is currently at the forefront of microkernel research and 
development.  This kernel was developed in the mid-nineties by Jochen Liedtke, one of 
the main proponents of microkernel-based systems.  Prior to L4, microkernels suffered 
severe performance hits compared to traditional, monolithic kernels.  L4 changed this by 
dramatically improving inter process communication (IPC) overhead compared to 
previous microkernels such as Mach.  L4 does contain some drivers and a scheduler, the 
functions of which could be handled by servers.  They are included to make development 
and setup easier for L4 programmers and users. [28] 
 The L4::Pistachio implementation of this microkernel was utilized in this project 
as the basis of a secure RTU.  Pistachio is maintained by the System Architecture Group 
at the University of Karlsruhe, where Liedtke had worked prior to his death in 2001 [28].  
Pistachio is the L4 implementation that supports the greatest amount of hardware, and is 
licensed under the BSD license [29].  Pistachio was chosen as the L4 implementation for 
this project because of the relatively large amount of documentation for it, as well as the 
community that provides support for it at both the l4ka.org and l4hq.org websites. 
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CHAPTER III: Designing a Hardened RTU with MILS 
 
3.1 Applying MILS to SCADA RTUs 
 
3.1.1 Current Operating System Security Paradigm 
 
Most operating systems that are currently in wide use employ a “Penetrate and 
Patch” [9] a.k.a. “fail-first patch-later” [5,8] system to provide security functions.  Under 
this paradigm, an operating system is released “into the wild” to be used by businesses 
and home users.  If a security failure is discovered, for example a hole or backdoor that 
has been exploited by a hacker, a patch is released to repair the problem and prevent 
future exploits using that particular security exploit.  This paradigm allows the multitudes 
of worms, viruses, and Trojans that are consistently on the news to cause serious damage 
[9].  
This approach to OS security is not acceptable for SCADA RTUs.  SCADA 
systems were created for use in critical systems and infrastructure.  By their nature, they 
can cause serious damage to property and persons if they are compromised.  Therefore, if 
a “Penetrate and Patch” situation were to occur, it would already be too late: failures that 
cause critical infrastructure to cease operations cannot be tolerated.  A security policy 
must be enforced that will maximize prevention of security flaws and minimize the 
damage any unforeseen flaws can cause.  This is where MILS, with its focus on core 




3.1.2 Communication over the Internet 
 
Since communication between RTUs and SCADA master units is occurring 
increasingly over the Internet, this project will focus on using MILS to bolster the 
security of networked RTUs.  MILS is well-designed to allow for enhanced security of 
networking functions if networking components are placed inside their own partition 
controlled by the separation kernel’s security policies [8].  This means attacks on 
networking protocols and features cannot spread damage to other partitions which are 
running critical monitoring and control tasks.  From [8], the benefits of this approach are 
the following: 
 “Network facilities can be used by multiple application partitions. 
 “Network data is processed in unprivileged user mode, eliminating a vulnerability that is 
a common avenue of attack. 
 “Complex protocol code such as Internet Protocol (IP) Ver. 6 can be evaluated and 
certified independent of the applications using the code, enabling reuse of the evaluation 
artifacts.” 
The core idea here is to place any communication with the outside world (i.e. the 
network) in its own partition, effectively cutting off all access to other applications except 
through the middleware and kernel, both of which should be verifiably secure in a true 
MILS system.  The following diagram illustrates the separation of applications into their 
own partitions on a MILS RTU. 
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FIGURE 3.1: A MILS RTU 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the overall security environment for a MILS RTU.  Each 
separate functionality can be placed in its own partition with its own user permissions and 
security settings.  We see here that networking functionality is contained in a single 
partition.  Likewise with the control and monitoring software that makes up the core of 
the RTU is in its own, separate partition.  Since all communication takes place through 
the PCS and the secure separation kernel (see figure 2.1 for an illustration of the PCS 
system), errors and security breaches cannot cascade from, for example, the networking 
partition to the control partition.  Also, information from the monitoring software cannot 
23 
be compromised directly through the network connection.  Also, as illustrated in the 
middle partition, separate applications, and even operating systems, may also run on the 
system with no threat to the control and monitoring software even if they are not verified 
or known to be totally secure. 
3.1.3 Handling of Network Errors in MILS 
MILS provides another important feature to PCs used as RTUs in that severe 
networking errors or attacks will not cause a cessation of operations throughout the entire 
machine.  Since MILS ensures that errors are detected and fixed locally in each partition, 
monitoring and control software running in other partitions will not be affected by the 
problems in the network-centric partition.  The information obtained by these partitions 
while the network partition is recovering can be sent to the SCADA master unit when 
networking operations have resumed normal functionality, preventing loss of data due to 
network component failure.  This is especially important if an RTU is providing control 
to critical components.  As long as the RTU can act independently until the networking 
partition has recovered, the hardware and infrastructure controlled by that RTU will not 
function any differently than if the connection had stayed constant.  Also, the networking 
partition can run in unprivileged user mode, removing the potential for administrative 
exploits [8]. 
  A partitioning communication system can be used on both ends of the network 
transaction to ensure end-to-end enforcement of security policies.  Using a PCS in this 
manner provides the benefits outlined in Table 3.1 (from [8]).  This setup can be used to 
securely synchronize and communicate over a network, as well as reduce the risk of 
networking errors by removing backdoors into the communication system. 
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Table 3.1 Benefits of Networking via PCS 
1. Strong identity of each MILS node in the network 
2. Separation by level or community of interest, MILS nodes connected by MILS cross-
domain servers 
3. Secure configuration and validation of consistency of all security databases 
4. Secure image loading 
5. Secure clock synchronization 
6. Provisioning of bandwidth / quality of service 
7. Suppression of covert channels (i.e. backdoors) 
 
3.1.4 Attempts to Obtain a MILS Product 
 
 As is evident, this project at the onset had the objective of obtaining a MILS 
compliant operating system and using that OS as the basis of an RTU.  However, this did 
not occur for a number of reasons, and the project has instead shifted to a related focus 
that will be explained in sections following.  First, an explanation of why a MILS product 
could not be obtained in time for the completion of this project. 
 In September of 2005 LynuxWorks, the current leader in supplying MILS based 
technology, was contacted about acquiring one of their operating systems for research in 
this project.  After several emails detailing requirements for the research, the 
LynuxWorks representative determined that the product we would need is their 
LynxSecure OS.  This real-time OS is LynuxWorks’ attempt at creating a verified MILS 
kernel at EAL 7, which would be the first of its kind.  LynxSecure will also feature built-
in secure networking, removing the need for the customer (or, in this case, researcher) to 
implement his or her own networking solution.   
This product would indeed provide a solid basis for this project’s research, but 
unfortunately LynxSecure is still not available at the time of this writing.  An analysis of 
the market shows that no other comparable MILS-based product is yet available from 
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LynuxWorks’ competitors, companies such as Green Hills and Wind River.  LynxSC, an 
interim version of LynxSecure designed to be verifiable at EAL 4, was scheduled for a 
spring 2006 release.  As of June 2006, neither LynxSecure nor LynxSC is available to the 
market. 
These complications led the researcher and his advisor to consider alternatives to 
MILS that could be implemented and researched within the given time frame.  This 
research would focus on applying some of the security techniques that are defined in 
MILS to RTUs.  This project will provide a basis for secure RTUs which can be 
expanded upon or modified when proper MILS products become available in the future. 
 
3.2 Implementing an RTU Utilizing MILS Concepts 
 
3.2.1 Alternatives to MILS 
 
 Since a MILS product could not be obtained in time, this project was refocused 
into researching what benefits MILS would provide an RTU and discovering how to 
emulate those benefits with a different system.  There were determined to be two major 
benefits that a MILS compliant system could provide, and these were abstracted into two 
different areas of research.  
 First of all, MILS provides hard partitioning of resources, the management of 
which is handled by the separation kernel.  As discussed earlier, this resource 
management scheme allows the system to contain any errors in a single partition, 
nullifying the effects of such errors on any applications running in other partitions.  If 
inter-partition communication is needed, a PCS provides verified means of secure 
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communication between applications in separate partitions by directly invoking the 
kernel’s security methods every time communication is required. 
 The second major benefit of MILS is the use of a small, hardened, verifiable 
kernel to manage the system.  The benefits of having a minimal kernel are many, not the 
least of which is the reduction of complexity.  This reduction of complexity means that 
fewer errors should occur in the kernel creation process, as number of errors generally 
correlates directly with the number of lines of code (LOC) in the kernel.  Coding errors 
residing in the kernel source often lead to exploits being discovered by malicious 
individuals after the product is released ‘into the wild’.  It is therefore desireable to 
reduce the potential for errors up front, and a kernel with the minimum amount of 
functionality (and therefore LOC) required is a step in this direction.  Having a small 
code base for the kernel also allows mathematical verification of the system, so a 
quantifiable figure can be placed on the security of the system, a feature which is not 
possible in a kernel with millions of lines of code. 
 With these two features of MILS in mind, a search for technology that would 
provide these benefits was conducted.  First of all, a version of LynxOS (version 4.0) was 
obtained to determine if it was MILS compatible.  Unfortunately, it is not as it does not 
have a separation kernel.  This OS distribution did provide one extremely useful feature, 
which will be discussed in the following section. 
 Through extensive research, it was determined that brick wall partitioning would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without a MILS compliant operating system.  
Resource separation has been mentioned in a few placed as a worthy goal even apart 
from MILS, but there are few implementations of such available to the public.  With this 
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in mind, the project’s focus was shifted to exploring the benefits of a minimal kernel for 
RTU security. 
 The benefits of such a kernel have already been listed.  It should be noted, 
however, that this project did not attempt to formally verify either kernel presented at any 
EAL as the process is lengthy and, as a proof of concept and first step, the work 
presented here was deemed sufficiently constructive for now. 
 
3.2.2 RTU Based on Embedded LynxOS 
 
 As mentioned in the previous section, LynxOS 4.0 provides some interesting 
features that proved beneficial for this project.  First of all, LynxOS is an embedded, real 
time operating system (RTOS) created by LynuxWorks, the company that will release 
LynxSecure at some point in the near future. 
 LynxOS 4.0 was originally obtained because the researcher was attempting to 
determine if it was MILS compliant.  It is not, but some interesting ideas arose from the 
study of this product.  An RTU is much like an embedded device in that it performs 
specific tasks, often on specific hardware, and reliability of operation is one of the most 
important features of both devices.  Also, LynxOS provides real-time scheduling support, 
an obviously useful feature for monitor and control in an industrial setting.  
 Upon further inspection, an even more enticing possibility was discovered.  
Included with the LynxOS demo is LynuxWorks’ Kernel Downloadable Image (KDI) 
package.  This package allows the user to make any desired modifications to pre-built 
kernels or to create his or her own kernel.  This KDI can then be booted from in a number 
of ways, including from distribution media or over the network.  The KDI package was 
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used to strip all unnecessary functionality from the kernel, with RTU code created by Jeff 
Hieb used to simulate the monitoring and communication of the RTU.  The specific 
implementation details of this RTU will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
3.2.3 RTU Based on L4::Pistachio Microkernel 
 
The Pistachio microkernel is currently the most widely used and supported 
implementation of the L4 microkernel.  The MILS principle of having a small, 
minimized, verifiable kernel is similar to the idea behind the microkernel.  The 
microkernel paradigm seeks to strip all functionality from the kernel that can be handled 
at a higher level.  Applications called servers provide any functionality that does not need 
direct access to the hardware, or that can utilize the already-existing kernel primitives for 
such access.  While the microkernel is not designed to be verified at an EAL, its emphasis 
on minimalization and strict kernel control of all calls made to the hardware provide an 
interesting parallel to MILS based kernels.  For this reason, it was determined that a 
microkernel based RTU could provide insights into the benefits of a minimal kernel for 
RTU security, and therefore speak to the benefits of MILS for RTUs. 
Pistachio was chosen as the microkernel to be studied in this project first for the 
amount of documentation and support available.  Also, there are user-friendly tools, such 
as a comprehensive build system, that enhance and speed up development for Pistachio 
systems.  This build system, called Kenge, will be discussed in the following chapter, 
along with all other implementation details for the Pistachio based RTU. 
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CHAPTER IV: Prototyping RTUs using LynxOS and Pistachio 
 
4.1 A LynxOS RTU 
 
4.1.1 The LynxOS 4.0 Operating System 
 
 LynxOS 4.0 is a real-time embedded POSIX-compliant operating system that was 
designed for use in critical systems where deterministic real-time performance is 
essential.  It was created by LynuxWorks, the company that is working on bringing the 
first MILS compatible OS to market in the near future.  LynxOS is compatible with 
UNIX and is similar in architecture.  Like UNIX, LynxOS provides full process and 
thread support with fork and exec system calls.  This means applications run in their own 
protected address space, protecting the kernel from errors created by erroneous 
application behavior.  Because if this similarity to UNIX, many UNIX applications can 
run with little need for alteration on a LynxOS machine with only a recompilation.  
LynxOS can also run Linux binaries without the need for recompilation using a built in 
Linux ABI compatibility layer.    
 The following table lists some of the features of LynxOS that led to the current 
research on its suitability for an RTU.  These features are listed in this form in the 
documentation provided with the LynxOS 4.0 demo which was used in this project.  
These features deal with both the operation of the kernel and the development tools 




Table 4.1 LynxOS Features 
Multiprocess and multithreaded environment 
Hierarchical, UNIX-like file system 
Kernel threads 
Industry standard Networking (TCP/IP) 
Support for diskless clients 
Industry standard GNU tools, UNIX-like utilities and UNIX-like shell scripts 
ROM-able kernel 
Modular scalable architecture 
 
 Some of these features, such as support for diskless clients and ROM-able kernel, 
could be helpful for small, embedded RTUs to be designed in the future.  While this type 
of RTU is not the basis for this project, it is a potential future benefit of utilizing this OS.  
Features such as industry standard networking, as well as GNU and UNIX tools and 
utilities, should ease the transition from more traditional development to development for 
a real-time OS.  These features, combined with the ability to create Kernel Downloadable 
Images, make LynxOS a strong candidate for the basis of our prototype RTU. 
 
4.1.2 Kernel Downloadable Images 
 
 A Kernel Downloadable Image (KDI) provides the basis for the bootable RTU 
studied in this project.  A KDI is an image that contains the LynxOS kernel, a file system, 
and any application code specified by the user.  This application code consists both of 
system utilities that are included in any OS, such as network and file managing utilities, 
as well as any code or applications that is desirable for use within the system represented 
by the KDI.  The KDI, once created, is bootable from flash memory, a disc, or over the 
network. 
 The creation of a KDI allows the developer to remove any unnecessary modules 
from the OS image to ensure that only the necessary applications and utilities are 
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included.  This allows the RTU developer to remove bloat, thereby reducing the memory 
footprint of the system, and to remove any unforeseen security vulnerabilities that may 
arise from unnecessary modules.  Using a KDI also allows the RTU developer to instruct 
the system to boot directly into the RTU code.  This feature was used in this project and 
will be discussed in more detail later.  
A KDI is created by utilizing the mkimage utility provided by LynxOS.  The 
mkimage utility leverages a .spec (specification) file which contains information on how 
the utility should configure the KDI.  This .spec file contains attributes detailing the 
initial set of files that should be included in the RAM disk memory image created by the 
mkimage utility.  Table 4.2 lists some of the more important attributes that were 
employed in the .spec file used for this RTU prototype.  These attributes are listed in the 
mkimage.spec man page and in the LynxOS 4.0 demo documentation, with some slight 
modification here for readability. 
 
Table 4.2 Important Attributes of a .spec File 
Attribute Description 
target=[x86|ppc] The target system 
osstrip=[local|all|none] Causes local symbol definitions to be stripped from the kernel 
text file. 
ostext=[ram|rom] Designates where the kernel resides in the running system. 
kernel=<path> The path of the LynxOS kernel to be used in the image. 
nodetab=<path> The device node table corresponding to the kernel 
root=[ram|rom] Specifies that the root file system is either resident in RAM, 
ROM, mounted from the device, or that there is no file system. 
directory= A directory on the target file system 
file= A file on the target file system 
source= Designates a fully qualified path name to a source file to be 
copied into the target file system as the file specified in the 
file=. 




4.1.3 The Developer.spec Specification File 
 
The demo for LynxOS 4.0 that was used for this project was shipped with a few 
pre-built KDIs, including their corresponding .spec files.  For this project, one of these 
pre-built KDIs called “developer” was modified to provide the basis of our RTU KDI. 
The developer KDI came with a specification file that included all networking 
components and other utilities for a fully functional OS.  For this reason, the .spec file for 
this KDI, called developer.spec, was modified to conform to the desired functionality of 
an RTU prototype.  The mkimage utility creates an image ending in a .kdi file extension, 
so to the image created in this project is named developer.kdi. 
As the developer.spec file contained attributes related to providing full OS 
functionality, including and Apache server, this file was modified to remove unneeded 
modules from the KDI completely.  Therefore, anything unrelated to networking or basic 
system functionality was removed.  Using the directory= and file= attributes, the 
directory structure and included files for the KDI were specified.  The original 
developer.spec file contained a great many such attributes.  Many of these were edited 
out of the file in order to exclude them from the KDI.  Exclusion of such attributes is 
accomplished by commenting out the line in the developer.spec, with a #, that contains 
the attribute that should be removed.  Appendix I lists the developer.spec file used to 
specify the attributes for this project’s KDI.  The lines commented out with the # symbol 
were attributes that were included in the original developer.spec file.  There were actually 
many more attributes that were removed for this project, but many of these commented 
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lines were edited out of the file shown in the appendix to reduce the length of the .spec 
file, allowing easier modification and readability. 
 The directory= attribute signifies a directory to be included in the image, and the 
file= attribute does the same for a file.  The main additions to the developer.spec file were 
made in the directory=/net attribute.  This attribute specifies what files and binaries 
should be included in the /net directory of the KDI.  The following four lines are the only 
file= attributes specified for this directory: 
file=rc.network  source=/tmp/newproj/60.developer/rc.network $(BIN_PERM) 
file=rtuDevice source=./rtuDevice   $(BIN_PERM) 
file=rtu  source=./rtu    $(BIN_PERM) 
file=rtuDevice.h source=./rtuDevice.h  $(BIN_PERM) 
The purpose of the file=rc.network attribute is to include the file indicated by the path in 
the corresponding source= attribute.  This source= attribute indicates the path to the file 
on the development machine.  The file indicated by the source= attribute will be copied 
into the /net directory with the name corresponding to the file= attribute, in this case 
rc.network.  The $(BIN_PERM) flag indicates that the file that is to be included in the 
image in a binary and is permanent, i.e. will not be deleted after the system is fully 
booted and all modules indicated to begin on startup have are running. 
 The rc.network file indicated above is essential for the operation of networking 
capabilities for the system.  The purpose of the rc.network file, as well as the 
modifications to it that were necessary for this project, will be outlined in the following 
section.  The other three targets of the file=attributes in the line above indicate the files 




4.1.4 The Rc.network File 
 
 On UNIX and similarly styled systems, rc files are used to specify startup 
commands for certain applications or the operating system itself.  In this case there are 
two rc files included in this projects KDI, rc.d and rc.network.  The rc.d file contains 
scripts designed to run any services that are desired upon system startup.  This file is was 
included in the pre-built developer KDI that was used as the basis for this RTU, and its 
significance to the current topic is that it calls rc.network to run with the following lines 
of code, which tells the kernel to look at the rc.network file if no scripts from that file are 
currently running: 
if [ -x /net/rc.network ]; then 
 /net/rc.network 
fi 
 Of more significance to this project is the rc.network file.  This file was also 
included in the pre-built developer KDI.  However, this file was modified in small but 
significant ways that allow the RTU to function.  The rc.network file contains scripts to 
setup and enable networking on the machine booted with the developer KDI.  It runs the 
ifconfig and dhclient commands to configure networking for the machine, which explains 
the attributes indicating the need to include these files in the developer.spec file.  The 
following lines of code are used to start the RTU portions of the code: 
# 
# Start RTU Server 
# 
/net/rtuDevice & 
start_it /net/rtu  
 The ‘/net/rtuDevice &’ start the rtuDevice portion of the code.  The & indicates 
that the application should run in the background, freeing the kernel up to run the next 
script in the rc.network file.  The ‘start_it /net/rtu’ command starts the rtu application, 
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which passes connection information to rtuDevice, which handles monitoring and control 
for pumps in an industrial plant.  The origin and functionality of these applications will 
be discussed in the following section.  To see the complete listing of the rc.network file, 
see Appendix II. 
 
4.1.5 RTU Code 
 
The code created for the RTU in this project was written by Jeff Hieb, a 
researcher at the Intelligent Systems Lab at the University of Louisville who is currently 
researching SCADA and RTU security.  The RTU project created by Jeff was written in 
C++ and makes use of several functions and custom headers spread out through many 
files.  The three code files most important to this project are rtu.cpp, rtuDevice.cpp, and 
rtuDevice.h. 
The rtu.cpp code creates a process that will listen for incoming connections using 
a server socket.  Incoming connections are communicated using the DNP3 protocol for 
SCADA communication, the support code for which is also included in the RTU project.  
A master control unit (MTU) can connect to the RTU via this method. 
The rtuDevice.cpp code contains the bulk of what would be considered typical 
RTU functionality.  It contains data structures and functions used for monitoring and 
controlling the levels of pumps in an industrial plant.  It accepts connection to an MTU 
via the connection initiated with the rtu process.  Of course, the program does not 
actually monitor or control any physical objects, but instead methods are included to 
simulate typical values an RTU in this situation would encounter.  There is a .NET based 
MTU that can remotely connect to this rtuDevice process through the rtu process.  This 
36 
MTU provides a GUI for providing logon information to the rtu to allow the remote user 
to monitor and modify values in the tanks.  It also provides information on the latency of 
communication signals, which will be discussed in Chapter V. 
The rtuDevice.h file is a header file that provides a definition of message structure 
for inter-process communication between the rtu and rtuDevice processes.  This code 
ensures that communication is standardized by providing structures for writing and 
reading messages, as well as user and permission lists, among other features. 
 
4.2 A Pistachio Based RTU 
 
4.2.1 The Pistachio Microkernel 
 The Pistachio microkernel is an implementation of the L4 microkernel, a high 
performance microkernel that improves upon previous attempts at microkernel design.  
The L4 API is the design document that defines the requirements for implementing a 
microkernel, and the Pistachio microkernel is the first version to implement the L4 
Version 4 API.  This API provides improvements in a number of ways over its 
predecessors, such as 32 and 64 bit support, multiprocessor support, and fast local inter-
process communication (IPC).  Table 4.3 lists some of the features provided by an L4 
microkernel that could prove beneficial to an RTU, including information from [28] and 
[32]. 
 Fast IPC improves performance of the system, so this would be beneficial to any 
operating system or embedded device.  The small number of fundamental mechanisms 
and kernel defined policies, combined with the small image size for the kernel, provide 
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an opportunity to study the MILS principle of a small, reduced kernel containing only 
essential functionality.  The privileged threads sigma0, sigma1, and root task are the only 
threads that can make certain system calls.  Sigma0 and sigma1 deal with memory related 
requests, while the root task helps control overall system operation.  These privileged 
threads separating higher level threads from certain system calls behave similarly to how 
MILS is designed to operate as well, as only highly trusted threads and processes have 
direct access to the MILS kernel. 
 
Table 4.3 L4 and Pistachio Features 
Fast IPC with low overhead 
Small number of fundamental mechanisms built in to kernel 
Almost no kernel defined policies (such as memory, 
protection, and process management) 
Small size (from 40 to 200KB) 
Privileged threads sigma0, sigma1, and root task 
 
 
4.2.2 The Basis for a Pistachio RTU 
 
 The success of the LynxOS based RTU did not transfer fully to the Pistachio 
microkernel.  While the RTU code from Jeff Hieb is a solid foundation on which to build, 
it is not yet compatible with Pistachio.  A number of difficulties led to this situation, not 
the least of which is the complexity of development for Pistachio due to the build system 
it uses.  Many of the calls used in the RTU code are not available in the C libraries that 
are built in to the Pistachio build environment, and networking support is not included in 
the kernel as was the case with the previous RTU based on the LynxOS kernel. 
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 Instead of reinventing the wheel and creating services to run on top of the 
microkernel to allow full networking support as is required by the currently available 
RTU code, this project has instead focused on unraveling the build system and providing 
a simple example of how to build programs for Pistachio.  A basic code example was 
used that was inspired by a previous, greatly simplified version of an RTU created by Jeff 
Hieb.  It generates some random binary values, transmits them, and simulates some 
network delay to compensate for the fact that networking is not currently supported.  
Transmission, in this case, it to standard output, but it would be simple to modify this to 
transmit over a network connection should one be devised in the future.  In this manner, 
the basis for a Pistachio based RTU has been established, even if the final product is not 
feasible within this project’s time frame. 
 
4.2.3 The Pistachio Development Environment 
 
 The Pistachio development environment, much like the Pistachio microkernel 
itself, is primarily a research project.  Whereas Pistachio was created and is maintained 
by the System Architecture Group at the University of Karlsruhe, the development 
environment for Pistachio is a product of the Embedded, Real-Time, and Operating 
Systems (ERTOS) group funded by National ICT Australia (NICTA).  ERTOS, as the 
name implies, focuses on researching various embedded and real-time operating system 
technologies.  They have also modified the Pistachio microkernel to their own embedded 
version, entitled NICTA::Pistachio-embedded, which focuses on embedded system 
concerns such as resource utilization and performance.  This L4 implementation would 
be a strong basis for an RTU, but the greater amount of support and documentation 
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available for regular Pistachio led the project in the more general direction.  The build 
system developed by ERTOS can be used either on their embedded variation or the 
original Pistachio, and was therefore selected to provide the build environment for this 
project.  This build system and development environment is called Kenge, and consists of 
four major components which will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.2.4 The Kenge Build Environment 
 
 The Kenge build system is designed to create a bootable image based on the target 
machine by compiling user-generated programs together with the Pistachio microkernel, 
sigma0, roottask, and any other code specified for the image.  The Kenge build system 
utilizes four major components, including a scripting language, toolchains, and two 
outside applications.  Kenge uses the SCONS build system to build projects, the first of 
the four components.  The build scripts that are used by SCONS based on the Python 
scripting language, the second Kenge component.  If building occurs on the target 
machine, the standard gcc version 3.3 toolchains are used for compilation of code.  This 
is the third component.  The fourth and final component is the QEMU simulator, a full 
IA-32 system simulator. [33] 
 
4.2.5 The SCONS Build System 
 
 The SCONS build system is based on the Python programming language. Builds 
are controlled by a top-level SConstruct file, which contains functions to set up the build 
environment and combine all the separate modules into a final, bootable image.  Lower 
level SConstruct files are also used to specify how the system should and link build 
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individual modules such as applications and libraries.  Two SConstruct files were 
essential to the build of the simple example rtu code.  As both files are titled SConstruct, 
they will be referred to as the high-level SConstruct and the low-level SConstruct. 
 The low-level SConstruct used for this project is a Python file which specifies that 
this module contains an executable program, in this case the C code file rtu.c.  Using the 
env.MyProgram() function targeting rtu.c, the low-level SConstruct file specifies to the 
build environment that rtu.c should be compiled and treated as an executable file.  Using 
the information from this low-level specification, the high-level SConstruct can properly 
handle the rtu module once the high level build begins.  The low-level SConstruct is 
listed in Appendix III. 
 The high-level SConstruct is more complex, as it specifies the overall build 
environment as well as any applications that should be included in the final bootable 
image.  In this file, the first step is to create the build environment for the machine, called 
env as indicated in the low-level SConstruct explanation above.  This environment 
determines the compilers and flags necessary for the build process on the specified 
machine.  There are then calls to specify the kernel to be used, in this case the Pistachio 
microkernel.  The rootservers, special processes that begin at boot time, are specified 
next, along with any libraries that are needed to compile programs in the build 
environment.  This program includes the “c” and “l4” libraries, as the simple rtu code is 
written in C and the “l4” library contains code relating to compilation for the L4 
microkenel.  Any applications that are required to start at boot time are then specified.  In 
this case, the sigma0 memory manager process and the rtu application are indicated.  The 
final two scripts combine the kernel and applications into a single bootable image, and set 
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that image as the default boot image for the system.  The high-level SConstruct file is 
listed in Appendix IV. 
 
4.2.6 The QEMU Simulator 
 
 Kenge uses the QEMU simulator to simulate the runtime operation of bootable 
images configured by SCONS.  QEMU is a full IA-32 system simulator, meaning it can 
run inside another operating system while simulating the functions of the created boot 
image.  The use of such a simulator eases the development process of a bootable 
operating system by running the system within the development environment, eliminating 
the need to hard boot the system from a disk, ROM, or a hard drive. 
 The Kenge environment is setup to simulate bootable images directly after a build 
by setting a “simulate” flag when calling SCONS.  One problem with using this method 
for simulation was an inconsistency with how Kenge calls QEMU.  When the simulate 
flag is set, Kenge calls QEMU after the bootable image has been created with the 
following command: 
   qemu –hda build/c.img –nographic –nics 0 
The problem here is the current version of QEMU does not use the –nics flag to specify 
the number of network interface cards to simulate, but instead uses a –net nic flag.  Even 
though this operation ends in an error, the simulate step is necessary to build the c.img 
bootable image as specified in the command.  This image contains all files necessary for 
system boot.  After the simulate command has been executed and stopped with an error, 
the QEMU simulator can be manually started targeting the created c.img.  The command 
for this execution will be specified in the next section. 
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4.2.7 Building, Booting, and Running the System 
 
 Once the SConstruct files are created and all needed support tools and files are in 
place, Kenge is ready to build the system.  The following command builds and links all 
modules into a single bootable image: 
   scons machine=pc99 
The machine=pc99 flag tells SCONS that the target machine is an IA-32 based PC.  To 
create and simulate the c.img bootable image, the following command is issued: 
   scons machine=pc99 simulate 
As discussed in the previous sections, this command ends in an error but correctly 
produces the c.img file that is needed for simulation.  QEMU now should be called 
manually with the following command: 
   qemu –hda build/c.img –nographic 
This command boots c.img in the QEMU simulator.  The –hda flag indicates that the 
target is a hard disk image, while the –nographic flag starts QEMU without graphical 
support.  This saves memory and processor resources, as the bootable image created for 
this project is purely text driven and has no graphical interface.  The –net nic flag is not 
needed because the default value is sufficient for this simulation. 
 Once the simulator has started, the kernel is booted along with the applications 
specified in the high-level SConstruct file.  The rtu code is started and begins its 
operation by asking the user to press a key to begin.  The code then generates and outputs 
a pseudo-random binary value represented by hexadecimal, simulates network delay, and 
attempts to measure the time needed for the operation.  The user can then choose to press 
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x to exit or any other key to end the program.  The time measurement does not work 
correctly when booted on Pistachio because the system calls needed for the functions in 
the time.h header file are not available from the L4 microkernel to this process.  The 
system boots correctly, processes user input and processes and generates binary output.  
Further work that could be done with this microkernel and build system will be discussed 
in Chapter VI.  The code for the rtu.c file is listed in Appendix V, and a sample output 
listing for the run-time operation of this code is provided in Appendix VI.  The code was 
running in the QEMU simulator on top of the simulated Pistachio kernel. 
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CHAPTER V: Performance and Security Evaluation 
 
5.1 Quantitative Security Analysis 
 
5.1.1 Objectives of Analysis 
 
 The goal of this project from the outset was to determine what benefits, if any, 
MILS concepts could provide to RTU security.  The LynxOS and Pistachio systems were 
utilized for the similarities they shared with certain MILS concepts.  This section will 
attempt to scrutinize precisely what security vulnerabilities can be closed for each of 
these approaches, what vulnerabilities are still open, and which of these open 
vulnerabilities could be solved with a fully MILS compliant RTU. 
 
5.1.2 Vulnerabilities Closed Using LynxOS 
 
 Table 5.1 outlines the security vulnerabilities that were closed by implementing a 
prototype RTU with the LynxOS KDI development tools.  These closed vulnerabilities 
are mostly related to MILS concepts, meaning that they are also vulnerabilities that 
should be closed by a fully MILS compliant OS and kernel. 
 
Table 5.1 Vulnerabilities Closed with LynxOS 
Small kernel, reducing complexity and risk 
Increased periods processing protection 
RTU applications run in unprivileged user mode 
Removal of shell from KDI 
Enforcement of remote communication using DNP3 protocol 
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 Most of these security improvements are specific to MILS concepts of secure 
communication and processing.  First of all, MILS calls for a kernel that is reduced in 
complexity from more traditional kernels in order to reduce the complexity, and therefore 
unforeseen risks, involved with a kernel containing hundreds of thousands or millions of 
lines of code.  MILS takes this a step farther and calls for a kernel to be formally and 
mathematically verified.  While such verification is not possible for the kernel used in 
this RTU setup, the kernel nevertheless takes a step in the direction of MILS compliance 
compared to more traditional kernels, and therefore increases confidence in the security 
performance of the system. 
 Periods processing is a MILS concept which states that exploits using the 
processor or networking interface cannot grant access to the system to an intruder (for 
more, see Chapter II).  Periods processing is one of the four security policies that defines 
the basis of the MILS standard.  The LynxOS based RTU increased assurance in periods 
processing in two ways.  First, all applications started after boot time run in unprivileged 
user mode.  This means that an intruder who manages to connect with the code from 
rtu.cpp that allows the remote connection to the MTU should not be able to exploit this 
connection to cause system changes that require root access.   
One argument against this notion would be that an intruder could somehow gain 
account information for root and achieve an apparently legitimate login with the stolen 
information.  This concern is addressed by the removal of the UNIX like shell from the 
KDI.  The shell is the command line user interface that allows a user to input commands 
to the system.  By modifying the developer.spec and startup scripts for the KDI, this 
functionality was removed from the image in order to reduce system complexity and 
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prevent exploits such as the one outlined above.  While the removal of the shell ensures 
that the system is secure from command line exploits, it also reduces the overall 
usefulness of the operating system for everyday tasks.  This was deemed to be a fair trade 
off, because RTUs are highly specialized machines with the singular purposes of monitor 
and control.   
All network communication after the initial DHCP acquisition of an IP address is 
handles via the rtu process.  This process utilized the DNP3 protocol for SCADA 
communication, effectively shutting out any connection attempt not conforming to the 
protocol.  While attempts by outside forces to connect could cause errors in the operation 
of the rtu and rtuDevice processes, functionality could be built in to auto-reboot after 
fatal errors or to allow reboots or re-running of applications with faults to be specified 
over the network connection with the MTU.  See Chapter VI for more on such potential 
additions.  While this security improvement is not related to MILS concepts, it is a side 
effect of the way RTUs and MTUs communicate and is implicit within the operation of 
this RTU, and is therefore included in the security analysis. 
 
5.1.3 Vulnerabilities Closed Using Pistachio 
 
The similarity of the microkernel concept to the MILS concept of a secure, 
minimized kernel is significant.  For that reason, microkernels address many of the 
concerns that form the basis of the MILS standard.  While this project did not create a 
prototype RTU complete with full networking capabilities, many security improvements 
resulting from the use of this microkernel setup become apparent on analysis of the 
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features of L4 and Pistachio.  Table 5.2 gives a brief overview of these security 
improvements, which will be discussed in detail following the table. 
Table 5.2 Vulnerabilities Closed with Pistachio 
Small, minimally complex kernel 
Most functionality provided by user level modules 
Privileged threads 
Address spaces separate services from one another 
 
The use of Pistachio as the basis of an RTU, similar to the use of the LynxOS 
kernel, builds on the concept of a minimal, secure MILS kernel.  Pistachio goes beyond 
the LynxOS approach to abstract out all non-essential functionality from the kernel and 
replaces such functionality with higher level system and user services. As the complexity 
of this kernel is greatly reduced compared to monolithic kernels that handle everything 
from file systems to networking, this kernel can provide the RTU designer with greater 
assurance that kernel functionality will not lead to errors.  Pistachio improves over the 
LynxOS kernel in this regard, as even that kernel contains much built in functionality and 
is more similar to a monolithic kernel, albeit reduced and streamlined for embedded, real-
time use. 
The privileged threads sigma0, sigma1, and roottask provide another level of 
abstraction between high level modules and certain system calls.  As long as these 
threads cannot be exploited, the system calls they are associated with cannot be exploited 
either.  This plays to the MILS idea that small, verifiable applications can run on top of 
the kernel to provide another degree of security between non-verified modules and the 
system.  If the code behind these privileged threads is written correctly and is free of 
security holes, intruders cannot gain access to any system calls these threads are 
associated with. 
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The idea of address spaces also supports a MILS concept, that being the idea of 
resource partitioning to prevent error propagation throughout the system.  Through the 
microkernel’s inter-process communication (IPC) system, programs can reside in 
separately assigned address spaces and still communicate through certain kernel IPC 
calls.  This also brings to mind the concept of a partitioning communication system 
(PCS) for a MILS based OS.  However, the microkernel IPC system is built in to the 
kernel while the PCS is a middleware component that runs between user level processes 
and the kernel.  Also, while address spaces protect processes from damaging and being 
damaged by errors in other memory spaces, there is no support for brick wall partitioning 
of processor resources.  Therefore this feature, while useful from a preventative security 
standpoint, is not a substitution for the partitioning provided by a fully MILS compliant 
system. 
 
5.1.4 Remaining Vulnerabilities 
 
 Though these two approaches close many security vulnerabilities extant in current 
networked RTUs, there are vulnerabilities still open that could be addressed by a full 
MILS system.  The first of these is the absence of resource partitioning between the 
networking code and the monitor and control applications.  An attack on system memory 
could effect the LynxOS based RTU, while an exploit of the processor could effect either 
system.  The use of address spaces protects the Pistachio based system from some 
memory errors, but is not as rigidly enforced as MILS brick-wall partitioning. 
 Another vulnerability is the lack of a verifiably secure means for end-to-end 
network communication such as a partitioning communication system (PCS).  While the 
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DNP3 protocol provides a network interface between the RTU and MTU, it is not 
verified like a PCS could be.  A security verified PCS would provide the additional 
benefit on a MILS system of securely handling partition-to-partition communication, 
providing an additional layer of separation between the networking partition and monitor 
and control partitions. 
 
5.2 Performance Analysis 
 
5.2.1 Latency Analysis for LynxOS RTU 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter IV, the creator of the RTU code used on the LynxOS 
prototype also created an MTU to remotely connect to the rtuDevice process via the rtu 
process.  This MTU provides a graphical interface that allows the user to provide logon 
information, logon to the RTU, and remotely begin the operation of the RTU.  The user 
can then monitor and change values in pumps simulated by the program.  The MTU 
constantly polls the rtuDevice to determine if any changes have taken place, and it 
provides mechanisms to record and store latency measurements.  Sample output from the 
latency measurement of this program for a short connection session is listed in Appendix 
VII. 
 Ignoring outliers due to loss of packets, which occurred only once during the data 
gathering process, some analysis on the latency data is possible.  The latency 
measurement is time between a request for information from the MTU and the arrival of 
the response from the RTU.  It takes into account transmission time to and from the RTU 
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as well as any processing that is required of the RTU once the request has arrived.  The 
output listed by the MTU is measured in milliseconds. 
 The data for this test ranges from 1.504661ms to 1.808051ms, with a median of 
1.559416ms.  The mean value for the latency represented by this data is 1.580219ms with 
a standard deviation of 0.050565.  The small standard deviation suggests that the data is 
clustered closely around the mean, an assumption which is borne out by the proximity of 
the mean and median values.  These round-trip latency times fall below the sampling 
time in most SCADA systems, showing the performance of this system is sufficient at 
least over a LAN connection.  
 This test was conducted via a local area connection with the MTU and RTU 
machines in fairly close proximity.  A system distributed at greater distances would affect 
performance, as would a connection over the Internet as opposed to intra-network 
communications.  However, the data obtained suggest efficient performance for the 
LynxOS based RTU, performance which should be more than sufficient for most 
SCADA communication. 
 
5.2.2 Overhead Incurred from Use of L4 
 
Microkernels, in their early days, were stigmatized for poor performance 
stemming from the design principals that guided there creation.  The L4 kernel was 
created as a response to such criticisms as a way to determine if microkernel architecture 
truly could provide performance comparable to that of other kernels.  Studies conducted 
on the performance of L4 can be applied to this project to determine if use of the 
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Pistachio microkernel is feasible in terms of performance for the overall RTU 
architecture. 
Studies conducted by porting Linux to the L4 microkernel showed throughput to 
be only 5% lower than that recorded from native Linux.  Load testing determined that the 
Linux L4 port, titled L4Linux, is 8.3% slower than native Linux if all loads are averaged 
and 6.8% slower if only maximum load is accounted for.  This is a huge improvement 
over previous microkernels, which could perform up to 60% slower than native Linux, 
but this data still does not lend itself well to high-performance applications. [34] 
An empirical study of a full featured RTU would need to be conducted to 
determine if a Pistachio can provide the required performance under run time conditions.  
As with all improved security measures, the trade off of performance for security may be 
necessary to ensure confidence in RTU operations over a network.  An average 8.3% 
performance hit should theoretically not be a problem for most RTUs as much of the 
processing of data is handled by the centralized MTU, requiring less processor power and 
fewer hardware resources than would be required otherwise.  This is a reasonable trade 
off for enhanced RTU security, but again an empirical analysis of performance, not to 
mention analysis of costs if better hardware is needed for the L4 based RTU, would be 
required before the deployment of such an RTU to the field. 
 
5.2.3 Kernel Size 
 
 The size of the kernel used in an RTU can be a vital statistic in certain situations.  
For example, an RTU based on a LynxOS KDI can be booted from flash memory or over 
a network on a diskless system.  This means the kernel and all application and support 
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data must fit into the system’s flash memory, ROM, or RAM.  The memory footprint 
required for the kernel should therefore be minimal while still providing all required 
functionality for the system.  This brings to mind again the MILS concept of a 
minimalized kernel containing only basic system calls and operations.  
 The size of the Pistachio kernel for IA-32 systems is 163,983 bytes, or about 
160.14KB.  This is within the typical 40 to 200KB range of microkernels sizes.  The size 
of this kernel should not be an issue, as it could fit on many cell phones with extra room 
for application data.  Of course, enough room must be provided for any servers providing 
functionality not in the kernel as well as RTU code, so kernel size is not the only size 
measurement that could be applied before deployment of an RTU design.  It should also 
be noted again that, with the decreased size of this microkernel, a certain performance 
penalty is incurred which should be considered whenever obtaining a hardware 
configuration for the RTU. 
 The LynxOS kernel is configured for the hardware on which it is running.  For the 
machine used in this project, the size of the LynxOS kernel is 1,246,244 bytes, or 
1.1885MB.  This is a significant increase over the size of the Pistachio microkernel 
caused by the more traditional monolithic architecture of the LynxOS kernel.  Even with 
an increase of over 7.5 times, this kernel is still small and should easily fit within most, if 
not all, memory configurations feasible for an RTU machine.  It is also a significant 
improvement over the size of more traditional monolithic kernels, such as the Linux 
kernel. 
 As an indirect comparison, it can be noted that the latest full version of the source 
for the 2.4 Linux kernel comprises almost 37MB worth of code and build rules in a 
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compressed format.  When uncompressed, the source measures over 167MB.  While this 
is not a direct comparison of kernel size, it demonstrates the difference in scale and scope 
of a monolithic kernel compared to an embedded kernel or microkernel. 
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This project, upon initiation, set out to analyze what security benefits, if any, 
MILS could provide for SCADA RTUs.  Although a fully MILS compliant system was 
not studied, the shift of focus toward architectures that provide features similar to MILS 
allowed the researcher to study some of the security concepts that form the basis of 
MILS.  Because of this, the project has generally accomplished its initial goals.  Several 
vulnerabilities were closed by these systems, indicating that MILS could indeed prove 
useful for RTU security, and that these alternatives could serve productively in the 
interim.  
The greatest success of this project came in the form of a fully functional RTU 
running on top of the embedded LynxOS kernel.  This RTU demonstrates how reducing 
underlying system complexity, a MILS concept, can provide the basis for a fully 
functional RTU while improving security by closing certain vulnerabilities.  This system 
allowed a quantitative analysis of closed security vulnerabilities as well as performance 
analysis via a remotely connected MTU application.  Since this RTU is based on a kernel 
developed for embedded real-time applications, performance is high and overall required 
resources are low, both desirable qualities for an RTU. 
Because of the research presented in this project, the future RTU researcher has a 
clear base from which to build upon to develop an RTU running on top of the Pistachio 
microkernel.  The concept of a microkernel is similar to the MILS concept of basing 
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security around a minimal, secure kernel.  The L4 microkernel goes so far as to provide 
some small amount of resource protection via address spaces for resident memory 
applications. 
Even with the success of much of the research conducted during this project, 
much remains to be done.  There are many further avenues of study available such as 
expanding the LynxOS RTU, developing a full-fledged RTU on top of Pistachio, and 
studying a fully MILS compliant system, all of which would address valid questions not 
answered by this project.  Such future work is discussed in detail in the following section, 
which should provide some guidance for future research on this topic, whether or not that 
research builds upon this project. 
 
6.2 Future Directions 
 
6.2.1 Expanding the LynxOS-based RTU 
 
 While the creation of a prototype RTU utilizing the LynxOS kernel downloadable 
image (KDI) creation tools was a success, there are many avenues still open for research 
and expansion.  First and foremost, a strong series of tests should be conducted to 
determine the exact security strength of the networking code native to the operating 
system.  LynxOS uses many customized functions such as its TCP stack to provide 
networking capabilities.  Because any KDI inherits the portions of the LynxOS kernel 
and major functionality as specified during KDI creation, thorough analysis of such 
features would be required before any deployment of a LynxOS based RTU.  
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 A more robust performance evaluation would also be a beneficial addition to the 
knowledge base for this RTU.  Better access to kernel documentation and kernel 
performance analysis from LynuxWorks would greatly aid this process.  Currently, 
LynuxWorks is rather closed regarding information about the inner workings of the 
LynxOS demo on which the RTU is based.  Advanced kernel performance evaluation 
tools would allow measurements on the number of clock cycles needed for certain 
operations as well as the amount of context switching, memory, and transfer time needed 
for such operations.  This information would allow the RTU designer to choose the 
optimum hardware for each RTU design, thereby improving efficiency, utilization, and 
performance yield for the unit. 
 As the RTU running on this system has no shell for command line user input, 
mechanisms will need to be created to allow the system to recover from errors.  For 
example, the system could auto-reboot if the kernel encounters a fatal error, or a remote 
reboot of a faulty application could be an option from the MTU controlling the RTU.  It 
would be impractical to perform a hard reboot every time a process, or even the entire 
system, encounters a fatal error it cannot handle on its own, so such options would be 
vital additions for future researchers to study.  Another feature that would need to be built 
into the communication code between the RTU and MTU would be the ability to 
retransmit or recover dropped packets, as drops can occur even over a LAN as 
demonstrated by the data in Appendix VII.  
 A future path of study for this machine would be customization of the LynxOS 
kernel itself, as opposed to simply creating KDIs utilizing the default LynxOS kernel.  
LynxOS provides the ability to accomplish this by modifying the kernel directory and 
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supporting scripts and makefiles.  According to the LynxOS 4.0 demo documentation, the 
kernel can be modified for performance, size, and functionality.  Such modifications 
could reduce the complexity of the kernel and bring this system a step closer to the target 
MILS concepts upon which this project is based. 
  
6.2.2 Expanding the Pistachio-based RTU 
 
Of the two RTU architectures researched for this project, the RTU based on the 
Pistachio version of the L4 microkernel demonstrates the most room for improvement.  
First and foremost, a robust networking interface for Pistachio must be developed as the 
basis of communication for the RTU.  The networking features should be in the form of 
servers, separate modules running on top of the microkernel, instead of integrated in the 
kernel itself.  This setup, the basis for microkernel design, ensures future extensibility and 
eases the maintenance and expansion of the networking modules in the future.  It also 
follows the MILS specification of a secure, minimally complex kernel to control the 
system. 
The code created for this project to work with the Pistachio build system and 
environment is not an RTU, but instead simulates some operations of an RTU as a proof 
of concept for microkernel use.  If research in this area is to continue, it will need to build 
upon the design and prototyping work presented in Chapters III and IV of this document 
to create a robust, fully featured RTU based on Pistachio.  A difficulty encountered 
during the research into the Pistachio microkernel is the lack of clear, efficient 
documentation to outline the features of the system.  This is true even for Pistachio, 
which appears to have the greatest amount of documentation support from the 
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microkernel development community.  For this reason, the work presented in this 
document will help the future researcher by demystifying development for a Pistachio 
based system. 
A more thorough performance evaluation should be conducted on this 
microkernel to determine its suitability for monitor and control applications.  Since the 
inception of microkernels, there has always been concern over their performance.  Many 
of these issues have been addressed in one way or another, but precise measurements 
should be recorded to determine if the overall greater amount of context switching 
required for operations with a microkernel could prove too detrimental to the 
performance of the system.  The reverse should also be researched to determine if 
microkernels could provide performance increases in certain areas. 
There are many implementations of the L4 microkernel and, as progress with this 
kernel is currently carried out through research and academic institutions, each 
implementation differs and can provide better functionality in certain areas.  The 
Pistachio implementation was chosen because of its current popularity for use in research 
and its relatively strong amount of documentation.  As mentioned previously, the 
NICTA::Pistatchio-embedded L4 implementation would be a good fit for an RTU, as its 
focus in on further reducing kernel complexity and memory footprint.  The Fiasco 
microkernel is also popular in the research world.  While this microkernel is not a direct 
L4 implementation, it was designed to be compatible with L4 as it was created to serve as 
a new basis for a pre-existing L4 project focusing on operating system quality of service 
requirements.  The l4hq.org website is the central hub for obtaining information about 
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current and legacy L4 projects, and should be consulted in the future if a desire for 
furtherance of the use of L4 in a SCADA RTU context exists. 
One upcoming L4 project should prove of interest to the researcher willing to 
investigate the use of L4 for RTUs.  That project is the Secure Microkernel Project (seL4) 
from ERTOS and NICTA [35].  The goal of this microkernel is to use formal methods 
and computations to provide a high degree of security assurance in the kernel itself to 
provide the basis of trustworthy embedded systems.  This seems to take a page directly 
from the MILS concept of kernel verification, and could be looked at in the future if 
research in this direction continues. 
 
6.2.3 Toward a MILS Compliant RTU 
 
 This intent of this project at the outset was to study the benefits gained by 
applying the MILS standard to SCADA RTUs.  As the focus of the project was forced to 
shift away from directly applying MILS to an RTU, the objective of applying MILS 
concepts to an RTU remained unchanged.  This project has demonstrated how some of 
these concepts may improve RTU security, but the work in this direction has only just 
begun. 
 This project was not able to study the impact of brick-wall resource partitioning 
for RTU security.  This feature of MILS would appear to be its strongest aspect in the 
face of network security threats, as discussed in Chapter III of this document.  Such 
partitioning would ensure networking errors could not propagate to effect control and 
monitoring applications and would provide a greater amount of confidence in the overall 
system. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter II, a number of vendors are offering products currently 
or in the near future that are designed to utilize MILS concepts.  Green Hills and Wind 
River are two embedded OS developers offering products with MILS-like separation 
kernels.  LynuxWorks also offers such products, and plans to introduce the world’s first 
verified MILS kernel in the near future.  The researcher who desires to study a true MILS 
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APPENDIX I: Developer.spec File 
The developer.spec file is used to specify the desired components for a bootable 
image created by the mkimage utility and kernel downloadable image (KDI) creation 
tools.  This is the file that allows the developer to include any applications or code that 
should be executed on the target machine.  Some comments were edited out for length 
and readability.  Attributes attached to unwanted files are commented out to exclude 
those files from the final bootable image.  This file is modified from the developer.spec 










# Boot-up method 
#flags=a 
 










# KDI files 
 
directory=/  $(DIR_PERM) 
 file=init   source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/init  $(BIN_PERM) 




# file=netstat source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/netstat $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=tcpdump source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/tcpdump $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=ps  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ps  $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=vi  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/vi  $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=chmod source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/chmod $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=hostname source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/hostname $(BIN_PERM) 
65 
 file=ifconfig source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ifconfig $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=drivers source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/drivers $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=devices source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/devices $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=ping  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ping  $(S_PERM)  
 file=dhclient source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/dhclient $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=ls  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/ls  $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=login source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/login  $(S_PERM) 
 file=reboot source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/reboot $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=sh  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/bash  $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=tset  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/tset  $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=mount  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/mount $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=drinstall source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/drinstall $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=devinstall source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/bin/devinstall $(BIN_PERM) 




directory=/etc  $(DIR_PERM) 
# file=passwd  source=./passwd   $(FILE_PERM) 
# file=starttab  source=./starttab   $(FILE_PERM) 




 file=dhcpd.conf  source=$(PROJECT_DIR_PORT)/dhcpd.conf
 $(FILE_PERM) 
 file=inetd.conf  source=./inetd.conf  $(FILE_PERM) 
# file=protocols  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/etc/protocols 
 $(FILE_PERM) 
# file=services  source=./services   $(FILE_PERM) 
# file=resolv.conf source=./resolv.conf  $(FILE_PERM) 
# file=hosts.equiv source=./hosts.equiv  $(FILE_PERM) 
# file=fstab  source=./fstab   $(FILE_PERM) 
 
directory=/etc/rc.d 
 file=rc source=$(PROJECT_DIR_PORT)/rc $(BIN_PERM) 
 
directory=/net       $(DIR_PERM) 
# file=inetd source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/inetd $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=rc.network source=/tmp/newproj/60.developer/rc.network 
$(BIN_PERM) 
# file=rtu_server source=./rtu_server   $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=rtuDevice source=./rtuDevice   $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=rtu  source=./rtu    $(BIN_PERM) 
 file=rtuDevice.h source=./rtuDevice.h   $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=rshd  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/rshd  $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=telnetd source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/telnetd $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=routed source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/routed $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=ftpd  source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/ftpd  $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=rlogind source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/rlogind $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=irshd source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/irshd $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=portmap source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/portmap $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=rc.local source=./rc.local    $(BIN_PERM) 
# file=unfsio source=$(ENV_PREFIX)/net/unfsio $(BIN_PERM) 
 
 
directory=/mnt  $(DIR_PERM) 
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directory=/tmp  $(TMP_PERM) 
directory=/usr/tmp $(TMP_PERM) 
 
symlink /bin/sh /bin/bash 
symlink /etc/rc.d/rc /bin/rc 
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APPENDIX II: Rc.network File 
The rc.network file contains scripts associated with running networking features 
at system startup.  The calls to the rtuDevice and rtu processes are contained within this 
file.  Extraneous comments have also been removed from this file to reduce length and 
improve readability.  This file was modified from the rc.network file included with the 





# $Header: /cm/src/net/inetd/RCS/rc.network,v 5.46 2002/01/29 23:37:08 
mooring Exp $ 
 
# A little start up routine to capture errors. 
start_it() 
{ 
 echo "Running $1" 








# 'cuz of the bash propensity to want a TERM variable at all costs, 
# and the fact that the networking daemons really don't want 







# Configure the software loopback device "lo" with hostname "localhost" 
# 
/bin/ifconfig lo0 localhost 
 
# 
# my_name is used for Ethernet interfaces 





# Change hostname appropriately to coincide with /etc/hosts 
# 
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# NOTE: If there is only the SCMP interface available, change  
# "my_name" in the next line to "bplane_name". 
# 
hostname "$my_name" 




# This starts the 3COM EtherLink XL 3C90X 
start_it /bin/ifconfig elxl0 up  
dhclient 
 
echo Network interface configured  
 


















# Commands for NFS Server support 
# Edit the /etc/exports file to specify the directories that are to be 







#[ -s /etc/exports ] &&\ 
#echo exporting directories for remote mount &&\ 










# Source a local script if it's there 
#  Here's a very good place to start xntpd 
 
#[ -x /net/rc.local ] && . /net/rc.local 
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APPENDIX III: Low-level SConstruct 
 This is the SConstruct file used to include the rtu.c code in the build conduced by 
the Kenge build environment.  This was modified from a similar SConstruct file included 
with the Hello project from ERTOS. 
 
# SConstruct file for rtu.c module 
# Modified from file included in Hello program by ERTOS 
Import("*") 
obj = env.MyProgram("rtu", 
                    LIBS=["c"], 




APPENDIX IV: High-level SConstruct 
 This SConstruct file is used by the Kenge build system to link together all 
modules with the kernel to form a single bootable image, which can then be simulated or 
used as a system boot option.  This file was also modified from a similar SConstruct file 
included in the ERTOS Hello project. 
 
# High level SConstruct 
# modified from Hello project by ERTOS 
 
# First step is to include our real build tools 
# tools/build.py includes the KengeEnvironment 
try: 
    execfile("tools/build.py") 
except IOError: 
    print  
    print "There was a problem finding the tools directory" 
    print "This probably means you need to run:" 
    print "  $ baz build-config packages" 
    print 
    import sys 
    sys.exit() 
 
# phrases detoning language 
phrases = { 
    "english" : "Hello, world", 
    "dutch":   "Hello, wereld", 
    "german":  "Hallo, Welt", 
    "french":  "Bonjour, monde", 
    "italian": "Ciao, mondo", 
    "spanish": "Hola, mundo" 
    } 
 
add_config_help("Options:\n") 
add_config_list("lang", "Which language do you want to compile for", 
"english", phrases.keys()) 
 
# setup the build environment 
env = KengeEnvironment() 
 
# specify the kernel to use as "pistachio" 
l4kernel_env  = env.Copy("kernel") 
#l4kernel = l4kernel_env.Pistachio() 
l4kernel = l4kernel_env.Application("pistachio") 
 
# Add support libraries for rootserver 





# setup the applications to run  
sigma0 = rootserver_env.Application("sigma0") 
rtu = rootserver_env.Application("rtu", phrase=phrases[lang]) 
 
# combine the kernel and applications 
#  into a single boot image 
bootimage = env.Bootimage(l4kernel, sigma0, rtu) 
 




APPENDIX V: Rtu.c 
 This code simulates some simple functions of an RTU, such as outputting data 
and measuring transmission time.  It is simply used as a stub to support the proof of 
concept of a Pistachio based RTU. 
 














      escape = 'x'; 
 press = 'y'; 
      for(int i = 0; i< 30; i++) 
      { 
  bytes[i] = 0x61; 
      } 
 int i = 3; 
 time_t t1, t2; 
 printf("Press any key to begin.\n");  
 
 while (press != escape) 
 { 
     press = getchar(); 
 
     t1 = time(NULL); 
     
     bytes[i]=bytes[i]+i; 
     
     printf("RTU: "); 
     printf("%d\n",i); 
     printf("0x%x\n",bytes[i]); 
     i = (i + 771) % 30; 
 
     /*insert some delay to account for transfer time*/ 
     for(int j=0; j<999; j++) 
     {  
  (void) time(&t2); 
     } 
 
     printf("Time: %d\n", (int) t1); 
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APPENDIX VI: Sample Output for Rtu.c 
 Listed below is some sample output created by booting the project image, which 
will run the rtu.c program after the kernel and all other necessary tasks have loaded.  
Notice the time is always output as 0.  This is because Pistachio does not support the 
system calls and variables that allow the code in the time.h header to work properly.  
Also note the code prompts the user to continue or exit after each output of a generated 
value.  This was done to give the user a feel for the execution time and input for the 
Pistachio based system and could easily be modified to run more autonomously.  The 
value after RTU: is the current, pseudo-randomly generated index of the byte array that 
stores all hexadecimal output values.  The hexadecimal values listed are the pseudo-





















Press x to exit or any other key to continue. 
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APPENDIX VII: Timing_log.txt 
 
 The following is sample output of the latency measurements of communication 
between the RTU and MTU programs.  The value denoted by the ‘*’ indicates an outlier, 
and is likely caused by a dropped packet during transmission.  The data has been 






















































































































































































API Application Programming Interface 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
DNP-3 Distributed Network Protocol version 3 
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level 
ERTOS Embedded, Real-time, and Operating Systems 
IPC Inter-Process Communication 
KDI Kernel Downloadable Image 
LOC Lines of Code 
MILS Multiple Independent Levels of Security 
MTU Master Terminal Unit 
NEAT Non-bypassable, Evaluatable, Always Invoked and Tamperproof 
NICTA National Information Communication Technology Australia 
PCS Partitioning Communication System 
POSIX Portable Operating System Interface 
RTOS Real Time Operating System 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 





NAME:  Brent Guffey 
 
ADDRESS:  Department of Computer Engineering and Computer Science 
  University of Louisville 
  Louisville, KY 40292 
 
DOB:  Somerset, KY – July 5 1982 
 
EDUCATION & 
TRAINING:  B.S. Computer Engineering and Computer Science 
   University of Louisville 
   2001-2005 
 
EMPLOYMENT: CECS Co-op at Bardstown Cable Internet 
   Bardstown, KY 
   2001-2003 
   
Software development position at Keane, Inc. 
Frankfort, KY 
   2006- 
 
AWARDS: Recipient of Provost Hallmark Scholarship, Graduated with High Honors 
 
